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Constitutional Law-LoYALTY OATHS-THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
RELAXES ITS STRINGENT SAFEGUARDS-Cole v. Richardson.
Loyalty oaths have long been imposed upon citizens of both monarchies'
and republics2 as conditions precedent to the granting of certain govern-
mental favors3 or to the withholding of certain punishments.4 But whether
the oath is taken to gain a benefit or to avoid a criminal sanction, the after-
math of refusing to take a loyalty oath is that the citizen is penalized. 5 This
is not to suggest that a loyalty oath is dangerous per se, although some
Justices of the United States Supreme Court have taken this view., Cer-
tainly a governmental body should not be denied the power to protect itself
from those who would destroy it;" nor should it be denied the right to
withhold benefits from those who would use them against the government.8
An oath system is an efficient, quickly administered, and self-executing means
of preventing the enemies of a government from taking advantage of the
programs and opportunities9 offered to the public. It allows the probe of an
14 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARimS 123-24.
2 H. HYMAN, To TRY MEN'S SouLs-LoALTY TEsTs IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1959).
3 E.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (property tax exemption); Adler v.
Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (teaching in the public schools); Garner v. Board
of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (public employment); American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (privilege to petition the N.L.R.B.); Ex parte
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866) (admission to the Bar); Peters v. New York
City Housing Authority, 307 N.Y. 519, 121 N.E.2d 529 (1954) (public housing); State
v. Hamilton, 92 Ohio App. 285, 110 N.E.2d 37 (1951) (unemployment compensation).
See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 268 (1951).
44 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *124, *376-77.
5 The citizen is penalized in the sense that he is denied the opportunity to enjoy a
benefit which is within his grasp for the sole reason that -he has refused to subscribe
to the oath. "The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may
be punishment, the circumstances attending and the causes of the deprivation determining
this fact." Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320 (1866). The Court in
Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952), held that deprivation of public em-
ployment, particularly in the schools, is not a penalty because such employment is a
privilege and not a right. This position was specifically overruled in Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
6These have been chiefly Justices Black and Douglas in their dissenting and con-
curring opinions. "Test oaths are notorious tools of tyranny. When used to shackle
the mind they are, or at least they should be, unspeakably odious to a free people."
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 193 (1952) (Black, J., concurring). See also Cole
v. Richardson, 92 S. Ct. 1332, 1343 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" 7 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
9See Note, Loyalty Oaths, 77 YALE L.J. 739 passim (1968).
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individual's allegiance to his sovereign with a minimum of effort on the
part of public officials;10 its violation is punishable as perjury;"i and the re-
fusal to swear allegiance automatically bars the individual from assuming a
status or position in which he might threaten the existence of government. 12
The hazard inherent in any oath system is that it fails to distinguish be-
tween those who truly menace the existence of government and those who,
in good faith, do not wish to compromise their first amendment freedoms.'3
Both groups are subject to the same penalties for refusing to take the oath,'14
and both may be criminally liable'5 for violating the terms of the oath if
they do take it.
The first loyalty oaths reviewed by the United States Supreme Court' 6
were aimed at testing the affiant's past loyalty'7 and were struck down'8
10 The only burden placed upon an administrator of an oath is to extend the oath
to the intended affiant, orally or in writing. When this has been done, his duty as a
loyalty investigator is ended.
" False swearing is punishable by the criminal law, but violations of oaths may also
result in discharge from employment. Note, State Loyalty Program and the Supreme
Court, 43 IND. LJ. 462 (1968).
12 See Note, Loyalty Oaths, 77 Ym L.J. 739 (1968).
13Id. at 766. See also Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) and Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
14 Conscientious, but loyal, employees who refuse to take an oath are more likely
to be penalized than those who actually intend to sabotage the government, because
the latter group will swear falsely with impunity. This result is discussed in Note,
State Loyalty Programs and the Supreme Court, 43 IND. L.J. 462, 483 (1968), wherein
it is stated:
A statute which allows subversives, trained to commit perjury, to take the oath
and thereby qualify, and which at the same time disqualifies those who refuse to
take the oath for reasons other than disloyalty, does not accomplish any legitimate
objective. The injury to the conscientious cannot be justified by any state
interest.
15 Punishment is normally reserved for wilful and knowing falsehoods. Cole v.
Richardson, 92 S. Ct. 1332, 1337-38 (1972); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 413 (1950). It is improperly imposed by an oath statute which demands
a greater duty of the afflant than the Constitution allows. Whitehill v. Elkins, 389
U.S. 54 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 US. 589 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt,
377 U.S. 360 (1964).
16 Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866) and a companion case, Ex
parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). In Cummings, the Missouri constitution
required those engaged in certain avocations in the State to disavow any associations with
the Confederate cause. In Garland, a Congressional enactment required a similar dis-
avowal as a condition precedent to the practice of law before the Supreme Court.
17 Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 318 (1866) and Ex parte Garland,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333,377 (1866).
18 See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 9.
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as bills of attainder 9 and ex post facto laws.20 Subsequent cases 21 involved
oaths directed at present and future loyalty;22 these were upheld,23 during
the McCarthy era, due to the Court's emphasis upon the overriding interests
of public safety and governmental self-preservation. 24 Although the oath
decisions of the late 1950's and 1960s25 did not expressly overrule prece-
dent, 26 they did exhibit an increasing concern for the protection of first
amendment civil liberties.27 In extending old safeguards28 and establishing
19 "A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial
trial." Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866). See also United States
v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
* 20 Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325-26 (1866):
[An ex post facto law is . . . one which imposes a punishment for an act
which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional
punishment to that then prescribed; or changes the rules-of evidence by which
less or.'different testimony is sufficient to convict than was then required.
21Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S.
485 (1952); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951); Garner v. Board of
Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); Osman v. Douds, 339 U.S. 846 (1950); American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
22 In Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), an ordinance required the
affiant to disaffirm any advocacy of violent governmental overthrow within five years
of its enactment. Although the oath was retrospective in nature, it was enacted per-
suant to the terms of a City Charter which had been amended some seven years before.
Within the terms of the Charter, then, the oath was prospective.23 In Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), however, the oath was held un-
onstitutional due to the lack of a' scienter requirement.
[Tihe fact of association alone determines disloyalty and disqualification [ac-
cording to the terms of the oath in question]; it matters not whether association
existed innocently or knowingly. To thus inhibit individual freedom
of -movement is to stifle the flow of democratic expression and con-
- troversy at one of the chief sources. Id. at 191.
But cf. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), which held that scienter
was implied in each clause of a strikingly similar oath.
24 See, e.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950).
2 5Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S.-54 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, '384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 US. 360
(1964); Cramp v. Bosrd' of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Nostrand v. Little,
362 U.S. 474 (1960); Speiser v.iRandall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).26But see Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), overruling in part
Adler v. Board of Educ, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
27The Vinson Court had been heavily criticized by its dissenting members for its
failure to take adequate consideration of freedoms guaranteed by the first amendment.
Adler v. Board of Educ. 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (6-3 decision) (Frankfurter, Black &
Douglas, JJ., dissenting); Gardner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 .U.S. 716. (1951) (5-4
decision) (Frankfurter, Burton, Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting); American Communi-
cations Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (3-3 decision) (Frankfurter, Black & Jackson,
JJ., dissenting). It should be noted that Justices Frankfurter, Black, and Douglas joined
with the majority in the Warren Court oath decisions.2 8 In Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 724 (1951), the Court held that
[Vol. 7:162
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nbw ones,29 the Warren Court took a much harsher view toward loyalty
oaths,30 in general..
' Recently the Bar has been given its first opportunity to determine how
the Court, as presently constituted, will decide loyalty oath cases in the
future on facts WVhich differ somewhat, from those of recent years.3 ' Massa-
chusetts imposes a loyalty oath upon all of its employees which requires
them to support the Constitution dnd to oppose the overthrow of the gov-
ernment by force, violence, or by any illegal or unconstitutional method 3'2
In Cole v. Richardsor,33 Mrs. Richardson had been hired as a research
sociologist at the Boston State Hospital5g4 .'After approximately six weeks
on the job, she was summarily dismissed for her refusal to swear to the pre-
;scribed oath.3  In accord with prior decisions,38 *the Court did not find
scienter could be implied in the oath. Justice Frankfurter assailed this conclusion on
the ground that oath statutes are hon-criminal in nature. Id. at 727. 'In Wieman v.
'Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), the 'Court identified scienter as knowing or wilful
participation in the conduct proscribed by the oath and held that it was 'a -necessary
element of the oath in order to avoid branding the affiant as guilty by mere association.
The Warren Court extended this doctrine in Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966)
to require that, to be punished for a violation of an oath, the affiant must also have had
the 'specific intent' to further the utilawful aims of his associates.
"
29See, e.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967) (overbreadth); Cramp v. Board
.of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961) (vagueness); Nostrand v. Little, 362'U.S. 474
:(1960) and Slochower v. Board'of Higher Educ., 350 U-S. 551 (1956) (not an 'oath
case) (due process hearing requirement); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (mere
refusal to swear allegiance cannot raise a presumption of disloyalty).
30 The Vinson Court considered that its duty was limited to balancing the interests
of governmental security against the interest of the individual in maintaining his first
amendment freedoms. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399
(1950). The Warren Court, on the other hand, subjected loyalty oaihs to careful
scrutiny while applying traditional tests of constitutionality. See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt,
377 U.S. 360, 367 (1964) (vagueness and overbreadth).
31 The Court's criticism of loyalty oaths, in the past, has been directed largely at
'negative' oaths which require a disavowal of certain conduct and speech activities.
Cole v. Richardson, 92 S. Ct. 1332, 1343 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Cole involves
an affirmative oath which requires duties of:support and opposition.32 1d.at 1334.
33 92 S. Ct. 1332 (1972) (4-3 decision) (Douglas, Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting)
,(Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., not participating).
34 Id. at 1334.
35 Id.
.ZLaw Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154
4,1971); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 -(1966); Ohlson v. Phillips, 304 F. Supp. 1152 (D.
Colo. ;1969) aff'd 397 US. 317 (1970); Knight v. Board of Regents, 269 F. Siupp. 339
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) aff'd 390 U;S. 36 (1968); Hosack v. Smiley, 276 F. Supp. 876 (D. Colo.
1967) aff'd 390 U.S. 744 (1968). These cases involve oaths which are very similar to
the Virginia loyalty'oath contained in VA. C6N T.-art. II, § 7 (1971) and VA.'CODE Ai1N.
§ 49-1 (1950). In view of the Court's approval of all of these -oaths,-it is-uliely that
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fault with the 'support' clause of the oath, which was a paraphrase of the
oath required of elected officials by the Federal Constitution.31 Arguing
that the "oppose" clause was a mere negative reiteration of the "support"
clause,38 the Court held that it too was constitutionally permissible. Be-
cause the oath itself was constitutional, Mrs. Richardson's summary dis-
missal was proper.39 She was not entitled to a due process hearing at which
she might state her objections to the oath and force the Commonwealth to
present extrinsic evidence of her disloyalty.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Cole bears closer resemblance to the de-
cisions of the McCarthy era, than to those of the Warren Court in that he ex-
pressly rejected a definitional approach4" which had been carefully established
by the majorities of the 1960's. The Court in the early 1950's similarly refused
to make careful examinations of the terms of the oaths before it.41 Conceding
that any loyalty oath tended to infringe upon the first amendment freedoms
of the affiant, the Vinson Court proceeded to determine whether such an
abridgement of civil liberties was justified to protect valid interests of the
local, state, or federal government.42 With regard to public employees, the
Court found that because public employment was a privilege and not a
right, no freedoms were abridged by imposing an oath as a condition prece-
dent to employment; the reluctant affiant could assert his beliefs and look
for a job elsewhere.4s The sole safeguard required of an oath system was
that it must only penalize those who willfully and knowingly engaged in
the proscribed conduct or speech activity.44
The Warren Court adopted a much different approach. Beginning with
the Virginia oath will ever be overturned. But see Pedlosky v. Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, 352 Mass. 127, 224 N.E.2d 414 (1967).
37 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1.
3s 92 S. Ct. 1332, 1337.
39M. at 1338.
40 "[W]e are not charged with correcting grammar but with enforcing a constitu-
tion." Id. at 1337.
411n American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), the Court ob-
served that significant constitutional questions would be raised if an oath were read
literally to include all those who might be referred to by its explicit terms. But it
refused to approach the oath literally. "It is within the power and is the duty of this
Court to construe a statute so as to avoid the danger of unconstitutionality if it may be
done in consonance with the legislative purpose." Id. at 407.
42American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 US. 382, 399 (1950):
When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the reg-
ulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgement of speech, the duty
of the courts is to determine which of these two conflicting interests demands
the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented.
43 Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952). See note 5 supra.
44 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952) and Garner v. Board of Pub. Works,
341 U.S. 716, 723-24 (1951).
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the assumption that first amendment freedoms were inviolate,45 the Court
looked askance at any oath which purported to require-more than minimal
loyalty to the constitutional system. 46 To protect an individual's right to
speak and believe as he wished, the Court adopted a highly definitional in-
terpretation of the terms of the oath47 and asked itself whether constitu;-
tionally protected beliefs, conduct, and speech activities might be compro-
mised by those terms. 48 If the terms were so vague that "men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at [their] meaning and differ as to [their]
application," 49 or so overbroad as to encourage the affiant to avoid engaging
in constitutionally protected activities,50 the oath was struck down. The
tests of overbreadth and vagueness were familiar constitutional principles
applied for the first time to render loyalty oaths fatally defective.51
The most significant restriction which the Warren Court placed on
loyalty oath programs and which the Burger Court comes close to destroying
is that no presumption of disloyalty should flow from the mere refusal to
ascribe to the required vow. 52 The government carried the burden of prov-
45 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 446 (1950) (Black, J,
dissenting).
46 Cole v. Richardson, 92 S. Ct. 1332, 1343 (1972) (Marshall, J, dissenting).
47 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958):
When we deal with the complex strands in the web of freedom which make up
free speech, the operation and effect of the method by which speech is sought to
be restrained must be subjected to close analysis and critical judgment in the
light of the particular circumstances to which it is applied.
48 Examples of the Court's "question and answer" analysis may be found in most of
the cases listed in note 25 supra. The Court resorted to this method so often that
Justice Clark was provoked to remark that "to conjure up such ridiculous questions, the
answers to which we all know or should know are in the negative, is to build up a
whimsical and farcical straw man which is not only grim but Grimm." Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 383 (1964) (Clark, J., dissenting).
49 Cramp v. B6ard of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961) quoting Connally v.
General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
50Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 62 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 609 (1967). See also NA.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
d1The Warren Court rejected loyalty oaths primarily for the vagueness and over-
breadth which specific terms imparted to them. See, e.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 US.
54 (1967) ("in one way or another"); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)
("seditious," "advise'); Baggett v. Bullitr, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) ("subversive," "knowl-
edge," "revolution," "promote respect, by precept and example," "institutions," "promote
undivided allegiance to the government").
52 In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), appellants were denied a tax exemption
for refusing to take a loyalty oath included in the application. If the tax assessor dis-
qualified any claimant based on the presence or absence of any facts in the application,
the claimant was entitled to a judicial hearing at which he had the burden of prpving
that he qualified for the exemption. The Court held that whether or not the oath was
pir7misxable, it could not be enforced through procedures which placed the burden
1972]
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ing .disloyalty the same as if the recalcitrant employee were -on trial for :a
crime. To ensure that the burden of proof always rested in its proper place,
the Court provided that anyone who refused to take an oath, as a condi-
tion of employment or any other public benefit, was entitled to a hearing at
which the state must go forward with evidence of disloyalty in order to
sustain the penalty imposed for such refusal. 53
Cole v. Richardson stands in contrast to the recent judicial history of
loyalty oaths in the United States. In holding that the "oppose" clause of.
the Massachusetts oath requires no greater obligation upon.the affiant than
the "support" clause,54 the Court has rejected the literal interpretation which
the Warren Court commonly attached to oaths of allegiance. If the word
"oppose" is given its ordinary meaning,55 a conscientious oath-taker may seek
the answers to two important questions. To what extent does he owe a
duty of opposition?58 At what-stage of an attempted overthrow could he be
called upon to exercise that duty?5 7 The oath is unduly vague because it
resolves neither question. Because an individual has the right to believe and
to argue that the government should be overthrown, 58 the Cole oath is also
of proof and persuasion on the taxpayer. "[Alppellants were not obliged to take thq
first step [of signing the oath] in such a procedure." Id. at 529.
5
31n Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956), a college professor
was dismissed without a hearing after he had refused to give self-incriminating testimony
before a Senate Subcommittee on Unamerican Activities.
The State has broad powers in the selection and discharge of its employees, and
it may be that proper inquiry would show Slochower's continued employment
to be inconsistent with a real interest of the State. But there has been no such
inquiry here. We hold that the summary dismissal of appellant violates due
process of law. Id. at 559.
Accord, Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971) and Nostrand v. Little, 362
U.S. 474 (1960), applying the Slochower doctrine to loyalty oaths.
54 The Chief Justice argued that the word 'oppose' could be no more indistinct than
the words 'preserve, protect and defend' which are authorized by the Federal Consti-
tution. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 1. But the Presidential oath and similar affirmative oaths
of support are permissable because they are underwritten by the Constitution, itself,
and cannot be held to unduly infringe upon freedoms guaranteed in that document by
the first amendment. 'Oppose,' on the other hand, is not sanctioned by the Constitu-
tion and cannot be automatically granted such preferential treatment.
55 Even a narrow construction of an oath must give "proper respect for the English
language." Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964).
561n the trial court, the Commonwealth lamely attempted to answer the question
in this way:
The ordinary citizen who has taken no oath has an obligation to act in extremis;
a person who has taken the first part [the 'support' clause] of the present oath
would have a somewhat larger obligation, and one who has taken the second part-
[the 'oppose' clause] has one still larger. Richardson v. Cole, 300 F. Supp. 1321;
1322- (D. Mass. 1969).
5.7 Cole v. Richardson, 92 S. Ct. 1332, 1342 (1 972) (Marshall, J, dissenting).
5$Brandqnburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-,.(1969); Noto.v. United States, 367 US.
[Vol. 7:-16Z
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overbroad since it requires the affiant "to 'oppose' that which [he] has -an
indisputable right to advocate." 59 Of course, by the Chief Justice's narrow
construction of the oath, a Massachusetts public employee who has a "con-
scientious regard for what he solemnly swears" 60 no longer needs to fear
that his first amendment freedoms will be invaded by ascribing to the oath.
But in achieving this result, the Court has left a decade and a half of loyalty
oath decisions in doubt.
The most serious difficulty with the Cole opinion is its erosion of the due
process hearing requirement established by the Warren Court. Chief Justice
Burger argues that if an oath is constitutionally permissible and the em-
ployee refuses to swear to it, then the state is justified in presuming that
the employee is or will be disloyal and is at liberty to discharge him'solely
on that basis.61 Thus, the Court makes a distinction between unconstitutional
oaths, to which a hearing requirement may be applied, and constitutional
oaths, to which a hearing requirement is inapplicable. This distinction is
unjistified and wholly unwarranted by precedent. Admittedly, all of the
oath cases which barred a presumption of disloyalty from arising upon a
refusal to take the oath62 or required a hearing to determine disloyalty 63
involved oaths which were arguably unconstitutional on the basis of previous
decisions. In each of those cases, however, the Court decided the due process
issue apart from and to the exclusion of the question of the particular oath's
constitutional permissibility.6 In addition to the fact that the Chief Justice's
conclusion lacks a foundation in judicial history, the presumption of loyalty
and due process hearing requirements are the only safeguards, outside the
290, 297-98 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 502, 505 (1951). Although wilful advocacy of violent
governmental overthrow is a crime under the Smith Act, the Court has taken great
pains to emphasize that criminal 'advocacy' is a term of art to be distinguished from
the advocacy or teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract principle.
59 Cole v. Richardson, 92 S. Ct. 1332, 1339 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
60Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964).
61 Cole v. Richardson, 92 S. Ct. 1332, 1338 (1972).
62 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).63 Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971) and Nostrand v. Little, 362 U.S.
474 (1960).64 In Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971)i the oath was divided into- five
parts. The district court had held three clauses unconstitutional. The appeal was taken
on the remaining two clauses which had been upheld by the trial court. One of these
clauses required the affiant to support the Constitution and was affirmed by the Court.
See note 36 supra. The other clause required that the employee disavow belief in
-violent governmental overthrow. The Court held that this clause violated the due process
hearing requirement but did not comment otherwise on its constitutionality. Justice
Marshall, in fact, was dissappointed -that the Court had not decided the first amendment
question. Connell v. Higgenbotham, supra at 209 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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appellate process, which allow an employee who is averse to oath-taking
to affirm his allegiance to the government without abandoning his rights of
inviolate free speech, belief, and association. These safeguards are tenuous
indeed if he must pursue a Supreme Court mandate, which is often decided
by the chance of a single vote, to secure them.
One may believe that the Burger Court is justified in construing loyalty
oaths narrowly to avoid declaring them unconstitutional 5 or insensitive to
civil liberties threatened by the very existence of such oaths. In either case,
it is submitted that this Court has undone much of the efforts of the Warren
Court to supervise and control the proliferation of loyalty oaths in this
country. The efficiency and conclusiveness of oath systems give them an
invidious character which has been bridled by the Court's due process re-
quirements.66 By substantially undermining these safeguards, the Burger
Court has left unprotected those who revere their country but are unable
to abide a compromise of their individual freedoms.
G.W.W.
65 1n almost every oath case, the Court has faced a choice between two conflicting
principles of the judicial process. One is that statutes should be narrowly construed
to avoid finding them unconstitutional. See note 41 supra. The other is that where a
statute tends to infringe first amendment freedoms, the legislature should be compelled
to draft it narrowly. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940). The Warren
Court adopted the latter principle in loyalty oath cases. The Vinson Court adopted the
former principle and the Burger Court appears to have followed suit.
66 See note 12 supra.
